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WELLMAN v. STATE: CONFUSING THE
STANDARD OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
In Maine, as in most other states, a person convicted of a criminal
offense is entitled to state post-conviction review upon proper filing
of a petition.' The Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure establish
deadlines for such a filing and for the responsive answer by the
State. Application for an enlargement of time in which to respond
requires the State to show cause. If, however, the State makes this
application after the initial period for response, the Rules impose a
much stricter standard-a showing of "excusable neglect." 2
1. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2121-2132 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
2. Rule 70(c)(2) governs the filing of amended petitions for post-conviction review
and the subsequent responses to these petitions:
If the petitioner has not been represented by counsel at the time of the
filing of the petition but expresses an intent to retain counsel forthwith or
has made application to have counsel appointed pursuant to Rule 69, the
assigned justice shall provide the nonindigent petitioner the opportunity to
retain counsel or shall appoint counsel for the indigent petitioner. Within
45 days of the date counsel enters appearance or is appointed, counsel shall
file either an amended petition or notice that no amended petition is to be
filed. Enlargement of this 45-day period is controlled by Rule 45(b). Following the filing of an amended petition or notice that no amended petition is
to be filed, the clerk of the Superior Court shall mail a copy thereof to the
respondent. Within 20 days of receipt of such copy, the respondent shall
file a response pursuant to Rule 71.
ME. R. CRIM P. 70(c)(2). Rule 71 defines the terms of the response to a petition for
post-conviction review.
The response shall be by answer, motion to dismiss, or notice that the respondent does not contest the petition. If an answer is filed, it shall respond
to the allegations of the petition. Argument, citation, and discussion of legal
authorities shall be omitted from the response, but may be filed in a separate document. The respondent may annex to its response or file with its
response whatever further documents it believes may assist the assigned
justice in determining the issues raised by the petition. Additional time to
file a response is controlled by Rule 45(b).
ME. R CRIM P. 71. If application for enlargement is made before the originally prescribed period, Rule 45(b) requires a showing of "cause" by the applicant. If application is made after the prescribed period, however, the rule imposes the much stricter
standard of "excusable neglect." The rule reads:
Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if
application therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be done if the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect: but the court may not
extend the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 36B.
37, 40, 76(c), 76(d), and 88(a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
ME. a CRIM. P. 45(b).
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In Welman v. State3 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting

as the Law Court, dodged an opportunity to determine how the "excusable neglect" standard should be applied in a post-conviction
proceeding. The decision in Wellman raises disturbing questions
concerning Maine's excusable neglect standard-questions reaching
beyond the confines of post-conviction proceedings and into Maine
criminal and civil law generally.
I. BACKGROUND

In September, 1986, following discussions with prosecutors and
pursuant to a plea agreement, Bruce D. Wellman entered pleas of
guilty in the Maine Superior Court to thirty-four counts of burglary,
theft, and robbery, arising from charges in Cumberland, Knox, Lincoln, and Sagadahoc Counties. Following his conviction and sentencing, Wellman submitted a petition 4 for post-conviction review based
on alleged errors in the calculation of his pre-sentence detention
credit.
When the State subsequently failed to respond to his petition
within the 20-day time5 limit, Wellman moved for a default judgment.' At this point, the State requested an enlargement of time in
which to answer the petition. The superior court never ruled on the
motion for default judgment, but did grant the State's motion for an
extension of time despite making no express determination of "excusable neglect."
After a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the superior court
found for Wellman7 and the State appealed. Wellman cross-appealed, contending that the Law Court "should not reach the substantive merits of the State's appeal because the [superior] court
failed to default the State and erroneously granted its motion to extend the time within which to answer his petition."
This cross-appeal therefore raised two issues: first, whether the
superior court abused its discretion by not defaulting the State; and
3. 588 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1991).
4. Rule 71 defines the terms of a response to a petition for post-conviction review.
See supra note 2 for text of Rule 71.
5. ME. R. CRiM. P. 70(c)(2). See supra note 2 for text of Rule 70(c)(2).
6. In moving for a default judgment, Wellman invoked Rule 1(c), which states:
"When no procedure is specifically prescribed the court shall proceed in any lawful
manner not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or of the State of
Maine, these rules or any applicable statutes." ME. R. CruM. P. 1(c).
7. [T]he court found that at the time of the plea agreement, Wellman subjectively expected that his sentence would be fully credited for all pretrial
time spent incarcerated in Maine, and that his subjective belief was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that even though Wellman's expectation was "neither legally correct nor part of the plea agreement ... " the
pleas were involuntary and allowed Wellman to withdraw them.
Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1179-80 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 1180.
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second, whether the superior court abused its discretion by granting
the State an enlargement of time within which to file a response to
Wellman's petition.
Because there are no express provisions for defaulting the State in
a post-conviction review, the first issue is clearly one of judicial discretion. Default judgments are not automatic and, indeed, there are
strong policy reasons for not defaulting the State in a post-conviction proceeding. 9
Yet, resolution of this first issue in the State's favor does not
render the second issue irrelevant. The Maine Rules of Criminal
Procedure do specify time limitations for filing responses and the
procedures for enlarging these limits. As noted above, Rule 70 provides that when responding to a petition for post-conviction review,
the State must file its response within 20 days of receipt of the petition. 10 Rule 71 adds that "[a]dditional time to file a response is controlled by Rule 45(b)." 1 Rule 45(b) allows the court, even after the
expiration of the initial 20-day period, to grant a party additional
time in which to file an answer if the party's "failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect."1 2 Two critical questions, therefore, arise
from the second issue. First, did the State in Wellman meet its burden of establishing excusable neglect? Second, if the State did not
meet this burden, what remedy was available to the petitioner?
Wellman is problematic because the Law Court failed to answer
both of these questions. Instead, in an apparent effort to reach the
merits and reverse the superior court's decision, it merely held: "We
discern no abuse of the court's discretion in allowing the State to file
a response."'" It left unclear, however, whether this decision was
based on (a) a determination that the State had established excusable neglect or (b) a determination that, despite the State's failure to
show excusable neglect, defaulting the State would have been inappropriate in this instance and no other remedy was available to
Welman. The need for a specific rationale in this case is important
because of the significantly different effects that each of these possible rationales would have on the future application of the excusable
neglect standard and on the procedures for post-conviction review.
Because Rule 45(b) required the State to show excusable neglect
in this instance, it is reasonable to presume that the Law Court determined that the State had met its burden." The problem with this
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
10. M& R. Cam.P. 70(c)(2). See supra note 2 for pertinent text of Rule 70(c)(2).
11. M&. 1%Cmsi P. 71. See supra note 2 for complete text of Rule 71.
12. ME R C IM.P. 45(b). See supra note 2 for text of Rule 45(b).
13. Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1180.
14. See State v. Toussaint, 464 A.2d 177, 179 (Me. 1983) ("Any findings necessarily involved in the post-conviction justice's decision, but not specifically articulated,
will be attributed to him.") (citation omitted).
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presumption, however, is that the State's excuse in Wellman was
obviously inconsistent with the strict standard of excusable neglect
previously applied by the Law Court in other contexts. 15 By determining that the State's excuse met this standard, the Law Court
would in effect create a sliding scale of excusable neglect that would
impose a less strict standard on the State when responding to petitions for post-conviction review than the standard imposed on other
parties in other contexts. Such a sliding-scale approach would not be
without merit,"8 but it would represent a departure from the Law
Court's prior applications of the excusable neglect standard and
would tend to complicate and confuse this otherwise consistently
applied and well-functioning standard. If the Law Court in fact intended such a shift, it should at least have provided a clear signal of
its intention.
If, on the other hand, the Law Court meant only to uphold the
superior court's decision to allow the State to file a response, it effectively undermined the force of Rule 45(b) by denying Wellman a
remedy for the State's inexcusable delay. While there are strong policy reasons for not defaulting the State in a post-conviction proceeding, an obvious unanswered question remains: If not default, what
remedy does a petitioner have in such an instance? If the answer is
"the petitioner has no remedy," why then do the rules impose a
standard of excusable neglect-indeed, any standard at all-on the
State?
The objectives of this Note are, first, to review the dilemma faced
by the Law Court in Wellman; second, to identify the options that
the Law Court could have pursued to solve this dilemma; third, to
examine critically the Law Court's expedient, result-oriented decision and its possible consequences; and finally, to advocate a rule
change that would resolve the Wellman dilemma by imposing a
lesser burden on the State when responding to petitions for postconviction review.

II.

THE DILEMMA IN WELLMAN V. STATE

Wellman posed a dilemma for the Law Court. On the one hand,
the State's excuse for filing a late response did not meet the strict
standard of excusable neglect that the Law Court had previously
and uniformly applied throughout various contexts. On the other
hand, the record clearly showed that the superior court had erred in
granting Wellman's petition. 1 7 In order to reach the merits of the
State's appeal, however, the Law Court had to avoid defaulting the
State.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 20-31.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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A finding that the State's neglect had been "excusable" would
solve this dilemma. The State argued that its neglect had been sufficiently excusable to justify the superior court's granting of an enlargement of time in which to file a response to Wellman's petition.
Indeed, the superior court had held a full hearing to discern the
cause of the State's lateness. There the State revealed that its response was late because it had been waiting for a transcript previously ordered by Wellman which contained crucial information that
would have affected the State's answer."8 To the Law Court, the
State asserted that "[ilt could be argued that the Superior Court
reasonably found that the reason for the State's delay-to file a
helpful rather than a perfunctory response to Wellman's petition-constitute[d] a reasonable (or excusable) basis for not immediately filing a categorical denial of Wellman's claims."' 0
In light of previous Law Court decisions, however, this excuse
does not rise to the level of "excusable neglect." "The Law Court
has taken the limitations imposed by Rule 45(b) on enlargement of
time seriously. In particular, it has refused to endorse extensions of
time granted by trial courts which have been in contravention of
Rule 45(b) and the particular rule governing an extension of time.""0
The Law Court has defined "excusable neglect" narrowly and has
limited its application to extraordinary circumstances. "(A]side from
cases of failure to learn of the entry of judgment, excusable neglect
should be found only in extraordinary cases where injustice would
otherwise result."2 The Law Court has explicitly applied
this strict
22

standard in civil cases and in the criminal context.
The circumstances in Lane v. Williams2 3 illustrate how rigidly the

Law Court has adhered to a strict "excusable neglect" standard. In
Lane counsel for the plaintiff departed on a prearranged vacation,
having first instructed his secretary to file a notice of appeal. The
18. Welman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1180 n.8.
19. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3, Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1991)
(No. Cum-90-199) (footnote omitted).
20. 2 DAVID P. CLUCHEY & MICHAEL D. SEr zINGE. MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE
§ 45.3, at 45-6 (1987 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 2 CLUCHEY & SEMTZINGERI (citing

State v. Williams, 510 A.2d 537, 538-39 (Me. 1986); State v. Westphal, 349 A.2d 168,
170 (Me. 1975); State v. Mower, 254 A.2d 604, 605 (Me. 1969)). But cf. 3 HARRY P
GLASSMAN. MAINE PRAcTIcEa RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED § 45.2, at 399
(1967) [hereinafter 3

("excusable neglect should not be required with any
H. FIELD & VINCENT L McKusIcK. MAINE
CIVIL PRACTICE § 6.2, at 112 (1959)).
21. State v. One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-Up Truck, 447 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Me. 1982)
(quoting Reynolds v. Hooper, 407 A.2d 312, 314 (Me. 1979)). See also Begin v. Jerry's
Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Me. 1981) (emphasizing that standard of excusable
neglect "in whatever form" remains strict) (citing Reynolds v. Hooper, 407 A.2d at
314).
22. See State v. Williams, 510 A.2d 537, 538 (Me. 1986).
23. 521 A.2d 706 (Me. 1987).
GLASSMAN]

technical strictness") (quoting

RICHARD

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:201

secretary was aware of the responsibility delegated to her, but three
days before the notice of appeal was to be filed, she received a phone
call from her eight-year-old daughter, who frantically told her that
the grandmother (who was babysitting the daughter) had collapsed.
The secretary left the office immediately and found her grandmother dead at her home. She did not return to work that week, but
stayed home in order to care for her daughter, who was profoundly
affected by the tragedy. The time for filing the notice of appeal subsequently expired.
The superior court in Lane denied a motion for enlargement of
time, concluding that the emergency situation that caused the secretary's failure to file the notice of appeal did not constitute excusable
neglect "on the part of the attorney."'2' Despite a strong dissent
which viewed the tragic event in light of the practical realities and
accepted practices of law firms, 25 the Law Court upheld the lower

court's determination. It concluded that the failure to file the notice
of appeal was not the result of an extraordinary circumstance, but
the result of an attorney failing to "establish[] reliable office procedures for ensuring that the notice [was] seasonably filed."2' 0
When viewed alongside Lane, the circumstances in Wellman cannot be considered extraordinary. After failing to move for an enlargement of time within the initial 20-day time period, the State in
Wellman claimed excusable neglect because it was awaiting the
preparation of a transcript. Both the superior court and the Law
Court appeared to accept this excuse. Justice Collins, writing in dissent, strongly criticized this decision: "The majority intimates that
the State's bare allegation, after the fact, that it was awaiting the
preparation of a transcript excuses not only its failure to file a
timely response but also its failure to file a timely motion for enlargement of time in which to respond. 27 The obvious, inexcusable
error was that the State did not move for enlargement within the
initial 20-day period. If it had so moved, the superior court could
have granted the motion "for cause shown. '28 Awaiting a transcript
may have been appropriate cause, but the State inexcusably failed
to take advantage of this lower standard.
Moreover, the State's failure to file a timely motion to enlarge was
due to its own neglect. Under similar conditions, the Law Court has
applied a particularly strict standard of excusable neglect. When
"the neglect is that of the party charged to act, some extraordinary
circumstance must be proven to justify excuse of such neglect.""
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 708 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 708-09 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 708.
Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1182 (Collins, J., dissenting).
ME. R. CRIM. P. 45(b). See supra note 2 for text of Rule 45(b).
State v. Williams, 510 A.2d at 539 (quoting State v. One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-
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Counsel for the State in Wellman had been duly served with a copy
of the petition but neglected to file a timely motion for enlargement.
Thus, the State must bear responsibility for this mistake.3 0 "[Miere
palpable mistake by counsel or by counsel's staff does not constitute
excusable neglect."'" Clearly, the State did not show excusable neglect in this case.
Equally clear, however, was the lack of merit in Wellman's petition, which the superior court had granted. Wellman, an inmate, had
filed a petition for post-conviction review contesting the validity of a
recalculation of his sentence by the Maine State Prison. Wellman
had been brought to Maine for trial while serving a New Hampshire
prison sentence. As noted above, he pleaded guilty in Maine superior court to thirty-four counts of burglary, theft, and robbery.
Wellman's New Hampshire prison sentence expired while he was
awaiting sentencing in Maine. Before the sentence was imposed, he
was given pretrial detention credit toward his sentence for the entire
time that he was incarcerated in Maine instead of credit only for the
time after his New Hampshire sentence had expired. The Maine
State Prison corrected this mistake by recalculating his sentence to
conform with the applicable statute.32 Wellman's petition contested
the propriety of this recalculation.
After a hearing on this post-conviction petition, however, the superior court found for Wellman. The superior court vacated Wellman's guilty plea, finding that he had subjectively expected that his
sentence would be fully credited for all pretrial time spent incarcerated in Maine at the time of the plea agreement. It concluded that
this reasonable expectation made the plea involuntary even though
the expectation was "neither legally correct nor part of the plea
Up Truck, 447 A.2d at 1229).
30. Cf. State v. One 1977 Blue Ford Pick-Up Truck, 447 A.2d at 1230.
With the delivery of the notice of judgment into the custody of the attorney's office there passes also to the attorney the responsibility for its handling. Attorneys "must organize their work so as to be able to meet the time
requirements of matters they are handling or suffer the consequences."
Id. (citing Begin v. Jerry's Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d at 1083; quoting Pinero Schroeder
v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 574 F.2d 1117, 1118 (1st Cir. 1978) (per
curiam)).
31. Eaton v. LaFlamme, 501 A.2d 428, 430 (Me. 1985) (quoting Begin v. Jerry's
Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d at 1083).
32. MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1253(2) (West Supp. 1990-1991). The statute

reads in pertinent partEach person sentenced to imprisonment who has previously been detained for the conduct for which the sentence is imposed in any state correctional facility or county institution or facility or in any local lockup
awaiting trial, during trial, post-trial awaiting sentencing or post-sentencing

prior to the date on which the sentence commenced to run ...and not in
execution of any other sentence of confinement, shall be entitled to receive
a day-for-day deduction from the total term of imprisonment required

under that sentence.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:201

agreement. 3 3 This conclusion, however, was an error of law.3 Thus,
the Law Court faced the undesirable result of essentially granting an
unworthy petition if it acknowledged the lack of a showing of excusable neglect and defaulted the State.
III.

OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE DILEMMA

The dilemma in Wellman was not one without a principled solution. First, the Law Court should have determined whether under
any rationale the superior court had the discretion to allow the State
to respond in this instance, and it should have defined the parameters of this discretion. The Law Court could have chosen either or
both of two rationales which would have placed the issue of the
State's ability to respond within the discretion of the superior court.
It could have decided either that the standard for excusable neglect
in the context of Rules 71 and 45(b) is a more lenient standard than
that of excusable neglect in the context of a direct appeal, or that
the failure of the State to show excusable neglect did not necessarily
entitle the petitioner to any relief.
The first possible rationale would require the Law Court to adopt
a "sliding scale" approach for applications of the standard of excusable neglect. Given the express limitations of Rule 45(b), which required the State to show excusable neglect in this instance, and
given that the State's excuse in Wellman was inconsistent with the
strict standard used in other contexts, the adoption of a sliding-scale
apjroach would have been necessary to place this issue within the
superior court's discretion.
Rule 45(b) defines the limitation of the court's discretion for enlarging a period of time for action. It reads in pertinent part:
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged
if application therefor is made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2)
upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect . .

.35

Of particular importance is the distinction between subheadings (1)
and (2). If a party moves for enlargement before the expiration of
the original period, the court may exercise its discretion if cause is
shown. After the expiration of the original period, however, the
court may exercise its discretion only "if the failure to act was the
33.
34.
35.

Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1179.
Id. at 1181.
ME.R CRIM. P. 45(b) (emphasis added).
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result of excusable neglect. . ... "
This language in Rule 45(b) clearly predicates the court's authority to use discretion upon a finding of excusable neglect. Judicial
3
discretion is not available when a "fixed rule" supplies the answer. 1
Rule 45(b) establishes a "fixed rule": an enlargement of time after
the expiration of the initial response period requires a finding of excusable neglect. In other words, Rule 45(b) requires the justice to
make a preliminary conclusion before exercising discretion.
Under the circumstances of Welman this conclusion would be impossible without relaxing the standard of excusable neglect. It would
not be necessary to relax the standard in all its applications, but
only to recognize that the standard could apply differently to the
State in the context of a post-conviction proceeding. Although the
Law Court has yet to apply a varying standard of excusable neglect
and has favored consistency with regard to the application of this
standard," there are reasons to justify applying this standard less
strictly in this particular context.
Among these reasons is the argument that excusable neglect is not
a rigid standard, but a concept which is defined by the context in
which it applies. The First Circuit embraced this notion in Coady v.
Aquadilla Terminal Inc.,3s stating:
What is excusable neglect should depend in part upon the importance of the matter involved and the prejudice, if any, to the other
party. We would not find the present neglect excusable were we
concerned with F.R. Civ. P. 60(b), but delay in filing a cost bond,
where no other action had taken place, is so insignificant and so
unprejudicial in any sense, that we think in justice it should be
excused."'
Federal courts have since extended this approach beyond this particular procedural context.,"
Similarly, Wellman was not prejudiced by the State's delay. In
this case, final judgment had already been entered against the peti36. Id. See Town of S. Berwick Planning Bd. v. Maineland Inc., 409 A.2d 688, 689
(Me. 1980) (interpreting requirement of excusable neglect to mean that the court's
exercise of its power to enlarge the filing period "is permitted only 'upon a showing of
excusable neglect.'") (emphasis added).
37. See State v. Dyer, 371 A.2d 1079, 1083 (Me. 1977) ("Judicial discretion implies that, in the absence of positive law or fixed rule, the justice is to decide the
question before him by his view of expediency, or of the demands of equity and justice.") (citing Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34, 38 (Me. 1975)) (emphasis

added).
38. Cf. State v. Williams, 510 A.2d at 538 (applying excusable neglect consistently
among civil and criminal cases).
39. 456 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1972).

40. Id. at 678-79.
41. See e.g., Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a Freedom of
Information Act suit).
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tioner, who was not contesting his conviction or his present impris-

onment, but only the recalculation of his sentence length.42 The
State's delay, therefore, did not prejudice him by restricting his
freedom. Applying the First Circuit's rationale in Coady, "excusable
neglect" in this instance should not embody the high degree of
strictness appropriate to contexts where a party would- suffer material prejudice by a delay.
Also, Rule 2 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure appears to
advocate such a flexible approach by emphasizing the furtherance of
justice rather than rigid formality: "These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They
shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."4 3 Whether this provision implicates a sliding scale for exusable
44
neglect is uncertain, but it does suggest a common sense approach
to criminal procedure and an intention that the individual rules be
interpreted with regard to how they relate to the entire body of
rules."
Indeed, one authority suggests that the interest in finality of judgments requires a strict application of the standard of excusable neglect in the context of an appeal from judgment, but that a less strict
application may be appropriate "in the general context [of] Rule
45(b)." ' 4s Wellman involved a petition for post-conviction review

rather than an appeal from the judgment of a trial court. Thus, the
standard of excusable 47
neglect in Wellman was applied in the general
context of Rule 45(b).
Furthermore, a post-conviction review is unlike an ordinary criminal or civil proceeding. The guilt of the petitioner has been adjudi42. See supra text accompanying note 32.
43. ME. R. CRIM. P. 2.
44. See 2 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER supra note 20, § 2.1, at 2-2 ("Rule 2 suggests a
less technical, common sense approach to criminal procedure."); 3 GLASSMAN, supra
note 20, § 2.1, at 7 (Rule 2 suggests that "the rules should be interpreted in a common sense rather than in a hypertechnical manner.").
45. See 3 GLASSMAN, supra note 20, § 2.1, at 7:
The rules are intended to establish an integrated procedural system, and
should be construed with a recognition of their interdependence. When construing the rules, a court or lawyer should seek to accommodate and harmonize the language of the various rules in order to carry out the objectives
announced in Rule 2. An interpretation of one rule, without consideration
of its relationship to the whole procedural system may very well result in
defeating the prime purpose of the rules.
46. 2 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 20, § 45,3, at 45-7.
47. Other rules apply the standard of excusable neglect to specific proceedings.
See ME. R. CRiM. P. 36(c) (appeal to the superior court in criminal cases); ME. R.
CaiM. P. 36B(c) (appeal to the superior court in juvenile cases); ME. R. CRIM. P. 37(c)
(appeal to the Law Court); ME. R. CrazM. P. 40(c) (application to the Law Court to
allow an appeal of sentence); ME. R. CRIM. P. 76(c) (review of final judgment by the
Law Court).
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cated and the presumption of innocence is no longer in effect. The
presumption is that the sentence is valid until the petitioner shows
otherwise.48 Therefore, the State's role is no longer that of a prosecutor. The primary purpose of its response is to fairly and fully inform the court, and not to direct an adversarial attack against the
petitioner.4 '9 The State's response in some instances may even benefit the petitioner's cause. Similarly, the petitioner, having lost a presumption of innocence, will not suffer unfairly by a delay. Thus, applying a liberal excusable neglect standard to the respondent of a
petition for post-conviction review may work for the public interest
without prejudicing the petitioner. "Common sense" might, therefore, demand a less strict application of "excusable neglect" in this
case.
On the other hand, if the Law Court had been unwilling to adopt
a sliding-scale approach to excusable neglect, it still could have
reached the merits of the petition. The court could have determined
that the issue of whether the petitioner was entitled to any relief for
the State's failure to show excusable neglect was a matter within the
discretion of the superior court. Certainly, defaulting the State is
not an automatic remedy in a post-conviction proceeding."0 The
more difficult issue is whether Wellman could be denied any and all
relief for the State's inexcusable neglect. The Law Court could simply have followed the example of the federal courts in order to resolve this issue.
The federal courts have recognized the unique aspects of postconviction proceedings and have found default judgments against
the State to be inappropriate. For example, in Bermudez v. Reid
the Second Circuit determined that a default judgment was an inappropriate remedy when the State failed to respond to a petition of
habeas corpus. Despite finding that the State's failure to respond
was "inexcusable" and that when a party fails to respond, the court
"is ordinarily justified in entering a judgment against the defaulting
party, ' 52 the Second Circuit vacated the district court's default
judgment for the petitioner. It stated:
48. See Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
874 (1984), which addresses this notion in the similar context of a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Maine's present post-conviction proceeding encompasses the remedies of habeas corpus and coraxm nobis. ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2122 (West
Supp. 1991-1992). Coram nobis challenges the propriety of the conviction while
habeas corpus challenges the legality of the custody. JAMEs GoBErT & NEIL P.CoHN.
RIGHTS OF PluSONERS

§

3.03, at 73 (1981).

49. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 22-4.4, commentary at 22.45 (2d ed.
1980).
50. Both the majority and the dissent in Wellman agreed on this point. Wellman
v. State, 588 A.2d at 1180; Id. at 1183 (Collins, J., dissenting).
51. 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984).
52. Id. at 21.
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[Wiere district courts to enter default judgments without reaching
the merits of the claim, it would be not the defaulting party but
the public at large that would be made to suffer, by bearing either
the risk of releasing prisoners that in all likelihood were duly convicted, or the costly process of retrying them. 3
Although the federal courts recognize that a default judgment may
in theory be available to the petitioner, 5 they
have yet to grant a
4
default judgment solely because of delay.
Similarly, in Welman a default would have prevented the State
from responding to an unworthy petition and led to the early release
of a duly convicted felon. 5 The Law Court, therefore, had adequate
grounds upon which to deny Wellman the remedy of default.
The more difficult issue is whether Wellman could be denied any
and all relief for the State's inexcusable neglect. The provisions of
Rules 71 and 45(b) imply the necessity of relief in order to make
them enforceable, but they do not mandate any type of substantive
relief for the petitioner. Thus, the Law Court could have adopted
the approach of the Bermudez court and addressed the State's inexcusable neglect not as an act by which the petitioner should obtain a
"windfall," but as grounds for disciplinary proceedings against the
attorney. 56 This approach would protect the public's interest by permitting the State to respond while at the same time giving some
teeth to Rules 71 and 45(b) so as to provide a real incentive for the
State to respond in a timely manner.
Having thus determined the parameters of the superior court's
discretion, the Law Court could then have examined the basis for
the superior court's decision to allow the State to respond to Wellman's petition. Whereas in this case the record was unclear on this
issue, the Law Court should have remanded the case for clarification
and provided the superior court with the precise parameters governing the trial court's discretion.
Which option the Law Court should choose is not as important as
the need for the Law Court to have made a clear choice. There are
justifications and sound arguments for both options. The failure to
53. Id.
54. Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Stines v. Martin,
849 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that granting a writ of habeas corpus
was inappropriate because delay was "minor," but not deciding the issue of "whether
a district court may ever grant a default judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding if
there is a serious delay").
55. After reaching the merits of this petition the Law Court concluded that the
superior court had erred in finding that the petitioner's plea was involuntary. The
Law Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for denial of the
petition. Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1181. Consequently, the petitioner was
credited with 140 days of detention credit rather than the erroneously credited 686
days. Id. at 1179.
56. Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d at 22.
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make a choice, when two choices are possible, creates uncertainty for
the future and may foster unnecessary litigation.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE LAW COURT'S DECISION

As noted above, the Law Court's decision in Wellman represents a
failure to choose between two possible rationales. In fact, the Law
Court appears to have consciously constructed an ambiguous decision, particularly since it avoided answering the questions raised by
Justice Collins's strong dissent. The court carefully explained the
requirements for enlarging the response time of the State and noted
the requirement of a showing of excusable neglect. The court also
explained the lack of procedures for defaulting the State in a postconviction proceeding. Notwithstanding these acknowledgments,
and without analyzing the superior court's rationale, the court simply held that it discerned no abuse of discretion.
At first glance the Law Court appears to have based its opinion on
the fact that the superior court had the discretion to default or not
to default the State. It agreed with the State that a default judgment would not have been the automatic remedy in this instance.
Unlike other rules governing timeliness in civil cases, there are
no express provisions for defaulting the State in a post-conviction
proceeding... .Although the State may be subject to default and
precluded from contesting the allegations in a post-conviction petition on the basis of timeliness, such defaults are not automatic, but
rather are subject to the sound discretion of the court5 7
In addition, the Law Court recognized a general policy reason for
not granting a default judgment: "Indeed, it is in the interest of the
public and helpful to the court for the State to be an active participant in post-conviction proceedings. '"50
Yet, unlike the court in Bermudez, which explicitly stated that
the State's neglect was "inexcusable" and which clearly outlined
why a default was inappropriate, the Law Court in Wellman remained noncommittal. Furthermore, it made no mention of whether
Wellman would be entitled to any relief besides default or if the
State should be penalized in some way. The Bermudez court, on the
other hand, denied relief to the petitioner but did recommend that
the State's attorney be investigated for professional misconduct.
These omissions by the Law Court suggest that the default issue was
not the true basis for the court's decision.
This suggestion is reinforced by the dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Collins agreed that default was not an automatic remedy,
but argued that this issue was irrelevant.
57. Welman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1180 (citation omitted). See also Reply Brief of
Appellant at 4, Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1991) (No. Cum-90-199).

58. Id.
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[R]efusal to grant a default for failure to file a timely response-even an unexcused failure like the one here-rests in the
sound discretion of the Superior Court. . . .But that proposition
is inapposite here, because the court never ruled upon Wellman's
motion for a default judgment. The appropriateness of dismissal as
a remedy for procedural default is simply not at issue in this case.",
The issue, argued Justice Collins, was whether the lower court had
discretion to grant an extension of time absent a finding of excusable neglect.6 0
The majority appears to have responded to Justice Collins's
point-but only halfheartedly and in a way which lent further confusion and ambiguity to the opinion. The court concluded the part
of its opinion addressing Wellman's cross-appeal as follows: "In this
case, the court granted the State's motion for an extension of time
to file its response after a full hearing at which the reason for the
State's delay was disclosed. We discern no abuse of the court's discretion in allowing the State to file a response."'" In a subsequent
footnote the court recited the State's excuse.6 2 In light of the Law
Court's prior acknowledgement of the requirement that the State
show excusable neglect in such situations, the clear implication of
these last two sentences is that the Law Court felt that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion because it had correctly found excusable neglect. If this implication were not the case and the Law
Court's true rationale was that the superior court validly exercised
its discretion by denying Wellman any relief, there would have been
no need to address the issue of excusable neglect. The existence or
lack of excusable neglect in this instance would not affect the holding. Because the Law Court did consider it and did incorporate it
into its holding, however, one must presume that the issue of excusable neglect is pertinent to the holding.
It appears that the Law Court was trying to justify the superior
court's decision to grant the State an extension on two possible rationales without considering upon what rationale the superior court
in fact acted. The problem with this approach is that there is nothing to indicate that the superior court acted under either rationale.
It never even ruled on the motion for default, but only on the motion to extend the time for the State's response.
As Justice Collins noted, the superior court "made no finding of
excusable neglect as required by M.R. Crim. P. 45(b) and 71.' '63 Furthermore, with respect to the previous strict standard, "the record
59. Id. at 1183 n.2 (Collins, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 1182 (Collins, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1180.
62. Id. n.8.
63. Id. at 1182 (Collins, J., dissenting). See supra note 2 for texts of Rules 45(b)
and 71.
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in this case provided no basis upon which the court could have
found excusable neglect."'O The Law Court could have presumed
that such a finding was made or implied,"5 but it should have reviewed this finding and, consistent with its approach in State v.
Williams,6 6 should have required the State to "allege[] facts sufficient to sustain a finding of excusable neglect. 61 7 Then, if it did or
did not find a basis for excusable neglect, it should have expressly
acknowledged this finding or lack thereof as it has done consistently
in the past. 8 More important, if the Law Court had found excusable
neglect, it could not have done so under the standard that it had
previously applied in other contexts. It could only have done so by
creating a sliding-scale standard of excusable neglect, and in Wellman the Law Court gave no indication that it viewed excusable neglect as a standard which could vary.
These omissions suggest that the Law Court did not consider the
finding of excusable neglect to be the dispositive issue, but rather
based its decision on the issue of default. As discussed earlier, however, this conclusion is equally difficult to make. The search for a
clear rationale in Wellman, therefore, follows a circular route of confusion with two possible but uncertain choices. The legitimacy of
each choice, however, does not quell the problems that this ambiguity threatens to cause.
The opinion's lack of clarity and an express rationale pose
problems for Maine's future litigants. If the Law Court had simply
explained its intention, the meaning of Wellman would have been
clear, whereas now the Law Court must resolve its meaning piecemeal through unnecessary litigation.
One problematic consequence of this decision is evident-future
litigants will cite the facts in Wellman as an example of a new-and
lower-standard for excusable neglect. While Justice Collins's fear
that the majority was "overthrowing [the] existing standard for ex64. Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1182 (Collins, J., dissenting).
65. See supra note 14.
66. 510 A.2d 537 (Me. 1986).
67. Id. at 539. In Williams the Law Court reversed a superior court's extension of
time to appeal because the record did not affirmatively show that the superior court
made a finding of excusable neglect. Nor did the appellee allege sufficient facts on
appeal. Id.
68. See State v. MacLean, 560 A.2d 1088, 1090 (Me. 1989); In re Amanda D., 549
A.2d 1133, 1134 (Me. 1988); Schmid Bros., Inc. v. Roberts, 538 A.2d 291, 293 (Me.
1988); Lane v. Williams, 521 A.2d at 708; State v. Williams, 510 A.2d at 539; Eaton v.
LaFlamme, 501 A.2d 428, 430 (Me. 1985); City of Portland v. Gemini Concerts, Inc.,
481 A.2d 180, 182 (Me. 1984); Haskell v. Phinney, 460 A.2d 1354, 1360 (Me. 1983);
State v. Weinstein, 457 A-2d 792, 793 (Me. 1983); State v. One 1977 Blue Ford PickUp Truck, 447 A.2d at 1231; Young v. Sturdy Furniture Co., 441 A.2d 320, 321-22
(Me. 1982); Begin v. Jerry's Sunoco, Inc., 435 A.2d at 1083; Reynolds v. Hooper, 407
A.2d at 314.
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cusable neglect"69 was probably overstated, the Law Court will have
to face the problem of reconciling the inconsistency between the
State's excuse in Wellman and the heretofore strict standard of excusable neglect. In other words, at some point in the future the Law
Court will have to choose between these rationales-i.e., that the
State did in fact show excusable neglect in Wellman or that the
State's neglect, although not "excusable," afforded no relief for
Wellman.
In the meantime, however, the uncertainty of Wellman threatens
to disrupt the application of the excusable neglect standard. Wellman will become an authority for those seeking to relax the hereto70
fore purposefully strict standard. Despite criticism of its rigidity,
and suggestions that it not be applied with any "technical strictness," 71 this standard has been applied strictly in order to promote
the finality of judgments and the termination of litigation. 72 The
strict standard has also become a tool by which the courts have imposed a high level of professional accountability and responsibility
on the legal profession. Most important, the Law Court has applied
the standard consistently and has thus created a solid, reliable
benchmark in both civil and criminal proceedings by which parties
can measure and predict the legitimacy of their excuses.
At some future point, however, the superior court will be forced
either to relax this standard or to distinguish Wellman, depending
on how it interprets the Law Court's opinion. No doubt, cases will
be appealed to the Law Court for a clarification of Wellman that
will require the court to make the choice it avoided in Wellman
itself.
Similarly, until that choice is made, Wellman will do little to discourage the State's attorneys from acting slowly or neglectfully
when responding to petitions for post-conviction review. That is not
to say that the ambiguity in Wellman is a victory for the State. On
the contrary, its lack of clarity may prove equally as misleading for
the State, depending on how the Law Court eventually resolves this
ambiguity.
Perhaps the most disturbing signal that this ambiguity sends is
that the Law Court is apparently willing to bend the rules of procedure in order to reach the merits of certain cases. Certainly it is
better to resolve issues of a post-conviction petition on the merits
69. Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1182.
70. See Lane v. Williams, 521 A.2d 706, 709 (Me. 1987) (Wathen, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the standard is unreasonable when an unpredictable medical emergency
of attorney's staff does not constitute excusable neglect).
71. See 2 RICHARD H. FIELD, VINCENT L. McKusICK & L. KINVIN WROTH,MAINE
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (West 1970). See also 3 GLASSMAN, supra note 20, § 45.2.
72. Lane v. Williams, 521 A.2d 706, 707-08 (Me. 1987) (The need for the finality
of judgments and the termination of litigation "compels [the Law Court] to construe
narrowly the excusable neglect exception to the time requirement for appeal.").
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rather than on a formality whenever possible, 7" but not at the expense of diluting and undermining the rules. As Justice Collins argued, the "rules are not meant to be mere suggestions" and the
State should not be allowed "to defy them with impunity."'" In fact,
the Law Court has argued that notwithstanding the need to construe the rules to secure justice, the concept of excusable neglect
75
must remain a strict standard.

If the standard is too strict for a particular context, the standard
should not be applied differently-otherwise it loses its claim to be a
standard. Instead, a different standard should be applied. By changing the rule, the Law Court could ease the burden of the State when
responding to petitions for post-conviction review.
V.

AMENDING THE RULES

Because it is important that the State respond to petitions for
post-conviction review, the rules governing these proceedings should
endeavor to accommodate a State response. The imposition of rigid
deadlines for the State's response frustrates this objective. As noted,
the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure currently require the State
to show excusable neglect in order to respond to a petition after failing to respond within the initial 20-day time period. The problem
with this requirement is the choice of standard; "excusable neglect"
is too strict for this context. Excusable neglect requires the proof of
some extraordinary circumstance and a failure to meet this standard
typically results in a dismissal or default judgment. In normal civil
or criminal proceedings this result may be beneficial, but, as Wellman indicates, this result is undesirable when imposed against the
State in a post-conviction proceeding.
It has been suggested that a more flexible approach to granting
enlargements of time in the context of responses to petitions for
post-conviction review is warranted: "A normal time for response
should be fixed by rule or by statute, but the court should be empowered to vary that time to meet individual circumstances.""1 The
federal rules exemplify this flexible approach in both federal postconviction proceedings: writ of habeas corpus" and motion attacking sentence.78 Each proceeding has its own set of rules, but both are
consistent with regard to responses to the petition. In both cases,
73. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 22-5.3, commentary at 22.61 (2d
ed. 1980). See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) ("It is too late in the day
and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities.").
74. Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d at 1183 (Collins, J., dissenting).
75. Givertz v. Maine Medical Center, 459 A.2d 548, 555 (Me. 1983).
76. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 224.4, commentary at 22.45 (2d ed.
1980).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
78. Id. § 2255.
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the presiding judge retains the discretion to impose an appropriate
time for the respondent to answer the petition.7 9 These rules afford
the court adequate flexibility and allow the court to consider the
unique circumstances of each case."0 Most important, these rules do
not establish rigid procedures for extending the time in which to
respond. Specifically, they do not refer the issue of enlargement of
time to a general rule of time which may impose unsuitable standards such as "good cause" or "excusable neglect." Instead, they
simply leave the issue of enlargement of time to the discretion of the
court.8 Therefore, the court is free to grant an extension when justice demands without having to apply an established standard such
as "excusable neglect" to the facts.
Maine's application of the excusable neglect standard to late requests for enlargement of time within which to respond to petitions
for post-conviction review is recent and perhaps inadvertent. Until
1986, Rule 71 set its own standard for granting an enlargement of
time instead of referring to the general rule for time, Rule 45(b).82
The former Rule 71 gave the court wider discretion in granting enlargements by requiring only a showing of "good cause," without imposing a showing of "excusable neglect" if the request was made after the initial 20-day period had passed. An amendment in 1986
changed the last sentence of Rule 71 and substituted the present
reference to Rule 45(b). At first glance this change may suggest a
desire by the Law Court to toughen the time requirements for allowing the State to respond to petitions for post-conviction review.
The actual purpose of the change, however, was to make Rule 71
79. Compare Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. following
§ 2254, at 1110 (West 1977) with Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, rule 4(b), 28
U.S.C.A. following § 2255, at 192 (West Supp. 1991) (The former states that "the
judge shall order the respondent to file an answer or other pleading within the period
of time fixed by the court . . . ." The latter refers to the "United States Attorney"
rather than to a "respondent."). See also United States v. Boniface, 601 F.2d 390, 392
(9th Cir. 1979) ("the court is given discretion to require a response and to set a time
for any response").
80. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, rule 4 advisory committee note, 28
U.S.C.A. following § 2254, at 1111. ("Rule 4, which contains no fixed time requirement, gives the court the discretion to take into account various factors such as the
respondent's workload and the availability of transcripts before determining a time
within which an answer must be made.").
81. See Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d at 20 n.1 (court granted several extensions
despite State's continual failure to respond or request an extension before the deadlines passed).
82. 2 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 20, § 71, at 71-1. The February 15, 1986,
Amendment "deleted the former last sentence of Rule 71, which had read: 'On motion and good cause shown, the assigned justice may allow the respondent additional
time to file a response.' The current last sentence of Rule 71 was added." Id. The
current last sentence of Rule 71 reads: "Additional time to file a response is controlled by Rule 45(b)." ME. R. CRIM. P. 71.
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consistent with Rule 70(c)(2).8 3 Rule 70(c)(2) had been amended to

impose time limitations on petitioners for filing petitions for postconviction review.8 ' The general time limits of Rule 45(b) were employed to curb the existing problem of untimely filing of petitions.8 5
In the name of consistency and fairness, Rule 71 was amended to
place the same limitations on the State for obtaining enlargements
of time when responding to these petitions.
As discussed earlier, however, the State does not always play an
adversarial role in these proceedings and therefore justice may not
demand equal standards for lateness. Although the State's delay in
responding to a petition may be inexcusable in some cases, this delay is not necessarily detrimental or prejudicial to the petitioner.
The circumstances in Wellman suggest that this rule change was unwise. The virtue of procedural consistency and equity should not be
a justification for imposing inflexible time restraints on the State
when these restraints may have a detrimental impact on justice in
post-conviction proceedings.
A possible solution to the problem posed in Wellman would be to
reinstate the "good cause" standard for granting an enlargement of
time in which to respond to a petition for post-conviction review,
regardless of the amount of time that has lapsed since the filing of
the petition. This change could be best accomplished by deleting the
last sentence of Rule 71 and substituting its former last sentence:
"On motion and good cause shown, the assigned justice may allow
the respondent additional time to file a response."8 0 This less stringent standard would strike a better balance between protecting the
public's interest and protecting the rights of the petitioner. Although the State's excuse in Wellman was not an extraordinary circumstance which could reach the level of "excusable neglect," it was
nevertheless a reasonable excuse which a standard of "good cause"
could encompass.
Another method of bringing more flexibility to this procedure
83.

ME. R. CraM. P. 71 advisory committee's note to 1986 amend., Me. Rptr., 498-

509 A.2d XL ("The rule is amended for consistency with the contemporaneous
amendment to Rule 70(c)(2).").

84. The February 15, 1986, Amendment to Rule 70(c)(2) imposed time limitations
on petitioners who, subsequent to filing a petition, retained counsel and desired to
amend their petitions. The amended Rule 70(c)(2) read in pertinent part:

After counsel is retained or appointed, the assigned justice shall provide
counsel the opportunity to amend the petition. Unless otherwise ordered by
the court, within 45 days of the date notice of such opportunity is mailed,
counsel must file either an amended petition or notice that no amended
petition is to be filed. Enlargement of this 45-day period is controlled by
Rule 45(b).
& SEITZINGER, supra note 20, § 70, at 70-4.
85. M. P, CRIM. P. 70(c)(2) advisory committee's note to 1986 amend.. Me. Rptr..

2 CLUCHEY

498-509 A.2d XL.
86. 2 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 20, § 71, at 71-1.
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would be to follow the approach taken by the rules that govern
omitted counterclaims in civil proceedings. In this context, the requirement of a showing of excusable neglect is not always necessary.
When justice requires, a late-filed counterclaim will be allowed notwithstanding a failure to show excusable neglect.8

7

This flexibility is

built into the rule by an express provision that permits this action:
"When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, the
pleader may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment."88 The use of a qualifying provision like "or when justice requires" when applying the excusable neglect standard to post-conviction proceedings would likewise permit the retention of the strict
standard, but would insulate the public from truly egregious results.
Amending the rules, as opposed to adopting a sliding scale of excusable neglect, has the advantage of preserving the strict standard
of excusable neglect in all of its contexts. If the Law Court were to
adopt a sliding-scale approach it would invite repeated challenges to
this standard and in turn detract from the predictability of the law
by acknowledging a myriad of definitions for "excusable neglect."
VI.

CONCLUSION

Wellman is problematic not because of its result but because the
Law Court failed to state clearly its rationale for reaching that result. The Law Court faced the possibility of granting a default judgment to an unworthy petitioner because the State failed to make a
timely request to extend its time to respond. Despite the requirement that the State demonstrate excusable neglect in this instance,
common sense and justice dictate that the State be allowed to respond. The Law Court followed these dictates, but erred by not trying to resolve this dilemma in a principled manner.
Since the superior court did not make an express finding of excusable neglect, the Law Court had a clear basis for examining the facts
underlying the presumed finding of excusable neglect. Rather than
upholding this finding as an expeditious way to reach the merits of
the State's appeal, the Law Court should have determined that the
finding of excusable neglect was clearly erroneous or expressly
adopted a sliding scale for the standard of excusable neglect. This
issue was the point of contention for the dissent, and the Law
87. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F.R.D. 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
("[D]efendants' delay was not due to any oversight or inadvertence but to inexcusable neglect. However, justice requires that they be allowed to assert these counterclaims ....").See also 2 RICHARD H. FIELD, VINCENT L. McKusIcK & L. KINVIN
WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 13.8 (2d ed. 1970) ("Although no cases have been
reported, it may be fairly assumed that the Maine judges take a similarly lenient
view.").
88. ME. R. Civ. P. 13(f) (emphasis added).
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Court's failure to address it poses future problems for Maine's
courts.89
The better solution to this problem rests not in future holdings
that reconcile Welman, but in a rules change that effectively
removes the excusable neglect standard from the State's response to
petitions for post-conviction review-thereby preserving the standard's uniform strictness in other contexts. Unless this change is
made, the Law Court will face recurrent Welman situations that
may force it to compromise the standard of excusable neglect.
The significance of Wellman is not limited to the narrow confines
of excusable neglect in a post-conviction proceeding. The Law
Court's failure to state clearly its rationale raises the larger issue of
the Law Court's standard of appellate performance. Predictability of
the law is a fundamental aspect of justice and one which reduces the
need for litigation. When the Law Court omits the reasoning of its
decision or suggests possible rationales without commitment to any
particular one, it leaves the lower courts and lawyers guessing and
increases the likelihood of unnecessary litigation.
Andrew L. Black

89.

See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.

